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Standard & Poor’s “The Leveraging of America: Covenant-Lite Loan Structures Diminish Recovery
Prospects” lists U.S. Foodservice and Thomson Learning as examples of transactions in even 2007 that had
trouble getting through syndication without more conventional covenant packages. This said, even though the
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relation to those covenant-lite loans- if any.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Figure 1. Decrease in Covenant Usage from Fitch Ratings Report 
Carol Clouse’s play on the idiom “out with the old, in 
with the new” in her post on the Leverage Finance News 
Blog describes the loosening of covenants on loan 
agreements starting most noticeably in 2005.  Those 
agreements with bond-like financial incurrence 
covenants instead of the more traditional financial 
maintenance covenants typically found in loan 
agreements have been coined “covenant-lite loans”2.   In 
other words, a company can actually breach certain 
minimum ratios set in covenants, but given that the loan 
has incurrence rather than maintenance covenants, the 
firm isn’t in technical default unless it subsequently 
engages in activities common as affirmative covenants, 
such as issuing dividends, making an acquisition, or  
borrowing additional funds3. 
Source: Graph taken from Fitch Ratings, 2006 p. 1      
 
According to data from Standard & Poor’s Leveraged Commentary & Data, there were just four 
covenant-lite loans ($2.4 billion) in 20054.  Possibly because of lower interest rates, abundance of credit 
and increased lender competition5, these covenant-lite loans soon grew in popularity, and volume 
quadrupled over the course of a year, with 37 loans totaling $23.5 billion in 2006, and then more than 
120 loans totaling $97 billion in just the first six months of 2007 (32% of overall loan issuance- up from 
8% in the comparable period in 2006)6.   
Fitch Ratings also documents starting in 2005“visible erosion in covenant usage” especially amongst 
                                                             
1 Clouse, Carol J., 2007, “Out With the Old Covenants, In with the Loose” mentions a study done by Moody’s 
Investors Services showing amendments to leverage covenants (loosened by 2/3s of one times Debt to EBITDA) 
between 2005 and 2007.   
2
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Oct. 2007 p. 14 
3 Standard & Poor’s Rating Direct, 2007, The Leveraging of America: Covenant-Lite Loan Structures Diminish 
Recovery Prospects 
4 Clouse, Carol J., 2007, “The Structure Du Jour, Or is Covenant Lite Here to Stay?” 
5 “Improved market conditions, dramatically lower default rates and heightened competition have greatly 
increased banks’ risk tolerance.”  See Fitch Ratings, 2006,p.1.  “When credit was abundant, many banks felt they 
were taken advantage of…’the gun was at their heads to reduce fees and spreads’”.  See Ryan, Vincent, 2009, 
Tripped Up 
6 See FN 3, p. 2 and p. 5.   
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non-investment grade syndicated loans.  Figure 1 taken from their report shows a decline in the median 
number of covenants for non-investment grade loans from 8 for each of the years from 2002-2004 down 
to 6 for 2005.   Also from 2004 to 2005, certain types of covenants saw declines.  For instance, amongst 
leverage covenants, debt-to-cash flow restrictions fell to 57% from 68% and senior debt-to-cash flow 
restrictions fell to 15% from 24%7.   
Since the onset of the credit crunch at the end of 2007 and accompanying significant decrease in 
liquidity however, the trend has reversed and banks have begun imposing more traditional (stiffer) 
covenants8.   Standard & Poor’s “The Leveraging of America: Covenant-Lite Loan Structures Diminish 
Recovery Prospects” lists U.S. Foodservice and Thomson Learning as examples of transactions in even 
2007 that had trouble getting through syndication without more conventional covenant packages.   This 
said, even though the trend may have already reversed, it is worth wondering whether there were 
negative repercussions felt in relation to those covenant-lite loans- if any.   
 
Figure 2. IMF Reports on Default Rates and Stressed Debt Leading into Recessions 
  
Source: Graphs taken from International Monetary Fund (IMF), Apr. 2008, p 15 
At first glance it would appear as though default rates have stayed relatively low leading into 2008- a 
fact when considered alone might lead one to believe that covenant-lite may not have been an issue- 
                                                             
7 Fitch Ratings, 2006, p. 2 
8 Ryan, Vincent, 2009, World Turned Upside Down 
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especially bearing in mind that many believed that the quality of loans had simultaneously declined 
during the cheap credit period between 2005 and 2007.  Looking at the two recent recessions, March-
November 2001 and   July 1990-March 1991 as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research9, 
default rates tend to go up dramatically preceding the official start dates of the recessions.  In the graph 
below on “Valuation of Financial Instruments Based on Implied Probability of Default” taken from IMF’s 
2008 Report, it is clear that heading into 2008 the default rate (green line) are still around historical lows.    
Nevertheless, as IMF highlights immediately following this fact in its report, this doesn’t mean that 
defaults won’t start increasing dramatically in 2008 and onwards; IMF notes that “both macroeconomic 
and credit variables have been signaling a pickup in the default rate over the last year”10  and notes the 
dramatic increase in stressed debt in high-yield markets in just the first two months of 2008.    
Possible Negative Consequences of Covenant-Lite Lending  
Coming into 2010 and after experiencing the surge in defaults in 2008 and 2009, it’s probably more 
believable that the increase in defaults often accompanying softening of the economy was merely 
delayed as a result of the loosening in covenants in many of the debt agreements formed in the years 
prior to the recent recession.  In fact, many had mentioned the possibility of just such a delay in actual 
defaults in contrast to historical cycles.   
Figure 3. IMF Bar Graph Depicting Percentage of Covenant-lite loans 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted the 
loosening credit standards and the growth of 
covenant-lite loans resulted in “increased financing 
flexibility from the lender’s side may help to 
explain the unusually low number of defaults” in 
the years preceding the recession.  Figure 3 taken 
from IMF’s October 2007 Report is just another way 
of expressing the data on the increased use of 
covenant-lite loans discussed earlier from Standard & 
Poor’s Leveraged Commentary & Data (showing 
percentages calculated using total number of loans 
instead of total dollar loan issuance).  As a reminder, 
loans falling into the classification of “covenant-
lite” are as defined by Standard & Poor’s Ratings 
Direct:  
“Standard & Poor’s defines “covenant-lite” loans 
as those with no maintenance financial covenants- 
                                                             
9 See http://www.nber.org/cycles.html 
10 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Apr. 2008 p. 14 
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such as maximum leverage, minimum fixed-charge coverage, and total debt limitations- that 
have to be maintained continuously throughout the term of the loan.  Instead, covenant-lite 
loans have only so-called ‘incurrence’ covenants11.” 
In his article “Corporate Defaults: The LBO Zombies Set to Stalk the Market”, Louise Bowman quotes 
Stephen Phillips, a partner in the financial restructuring and insolvency practice at White & Case: “If 
default settings had been where they were a few years ago, we would definitely have seen more 
defaults”.  Bowman believed that the widespread adoption of covenant loose loans would result in the 
creation of “zombie firms”, companies that underperform but are able to continue destroying firm value 
without lender interference because traditional triggers that would normally prompt some level of 
restructuring are absent.  He further quotes Philippe Lautenberg, director in the European Special 
Situations Group at Credit Suisse, at the October 2008 Loan Market Association Conference: “loose 
structures mean that as and when the business breaks down it will be much, much worse.”   Others 
warn that as a result, when companies do eventually default, recovery rates will probably be markedly 
lower than expected from historical comparisons.  Simon Davies, vice-president at Blackstone Group 
adds that “loans with covenants are the early warning signal that should get everyone round the table, 
but this has been diluted…now the fire alarm will ring late and loud.”   
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
This research project will seek to answer broadly the question regarding possible implications of 
loosened covenant structures from the easy credit period from 2005-2007.   As mentioned before, many 
predict or at least believe the implications of loosened covenant structure will manifest as a more 
dramatic deterioration of firm financial health before the occurrence of technical default.  One way to 
infer the economic health of a firm is through analysis of financial ratios.  Research has shown that 
financial statement derived variables can contain useful information for predicting stock returns12 and 
are commonly used in general valuation; for instance, Ou and Penman (1989) identify ratios that had 
strong predictive value for earnings changes in the future and Nissim and Penman (2001) outline 
financial statement analysis for use in equity valuation.  Many papers have also delineated use of 
financial ratios specifically in the prediction of distress or firm failures or documented correlation 
between levels of specific ratios and bankruptcy13.   
Drawing on this research, I chose to use financial ratios as indicators of financial health, and as such, use 
these ratios as a basis for comparison between firms violating covenants in past years versus firms in 
violation more recently.  Based on our hypothesis, because of the loosening in covenants from 2005-
2007, financial ratios should indicate greater deterioration in financial health at the time of violation for 
firms in the recent recession versus those that were in violation in the past.   
                                                             
11 See FN 3, p. 2.   
12 Ou, J. and S. Penman (1989), Holthausen, R. and D. Larcker (1992), Lev, B. and S.R. Thiagarajan (1993).  
13 Beaver(1966), Beaver et al. (2005), Lau (1987)and Deakin (1972).  
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Specific Methodology 
A mixture of profitability, leverage and liquidity or cash flow generation ratios were chosen for 
comparison based on existing research detailing use of financial statement information or calculated 
ratios in predicting bankruptcy or failure.  Under profitability, I looked primarily at return on assets (ROA) 
defined as earnings before interest divided by total assets at the beginning of the year, with a higher 
ROA indicating in general greater financial health.  Under leverage, I chose to look at the debt to assets 
ratio (D/A) defined as total debt divided by total assets.  Other measures of leverage, including book 
Debt to Equity ratio (D/E) and LTA, which Beaver et al. (2005) defines as total liabilities, as opposed to 
just debt, divided by total assets, as well as ETL, a measure of a firm’s ability to service debt defined as 
EBITDA divided by total liabilities at the beginning of the year were also chosen for comparison.  
Liquidity ratios picked for comparison were the current ratio (defined as current assets over current 
liabilities), quick ratio (defined as the sum of cash and receivables divided by current liabilities), and then 
working capital over total assets (defined as current assets minus current liabilities, over total assets). 
These liquidity ratios are common ratios examined by analysts in valuation, and were also amongst the 
lowest in percentage error in predicting firm failure in a discriminant analysis done in Deakin (1972).    
I wanted to look into the financial state of firms in violation of looser covenants set during 2005 to 2007, 
so logically, I would need to examine firms in 2008.  But, with 2008 being the start of a rather severe 
recession, I wanted to make a comparison to firms that were in violation of arguably less loose 
covenants within the greater context of a recession as well- in an attempt to minimize confounding 
effects  of the recession on the deterioration of 2008 firms’ financial health.  Therefore, in terms of the 
firms for which the comparison is to be made, I decided to compare firms in violation in 2001 and in 
2008, the simple rationale being that 2001 encompasses the most recent recession as recognized by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).  Research done by Fitch Ratings (2007) noting significant 
decrease in frequency of coverage and leverage covenants (key covenants) leading into 2008 relative to 
2001 also leads me to believe that though there may have been some level of covenant loosening 
leading into 2001 as well, there still existed stricter loan covenant packages in comparison to those seen 
more recently.   
Also, in case general “normal” ratios, normal meaning for firms not in violation, shifted significantly 
between 2001 and 2008 in a way that may invalidate results of a comparison, these same financial ratios 
are to be calculated for non-violation firms for the two years as well.   
Finally, using the first two digits of each firm’s SIC code to sort the data, I conducted a more detailed 
analytic comparison between 2001 and 2008 by industry.   
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Source: Graph taken from Fitch Ratings, 2007 p. 3 
Data 
To begin the analysis, I obtained from Professor Gregory Nini at the Wharton School a sample of firms, 
each of which over the years 1996 through 2008 had mention of covenant violation or compliance in 
their financial statements (from here onwards referred to as violation data).  The data on violations was 
collected via a text-search algorithm that searches for word “covenant” in SEC 10-K filings, which, if 
found, triggers a search in the three lines above and below for the words “waiv,” “viol,” “in default,” 
“modif,” and “not in compliance”.   I merged said violation data with individual firm simplified financial 
statement data downloaded from Compustat for each year.  From there, specific ratios chosen for 
analysis were calculated.     
 After separating out 2001 and 2008 data from the other years, it was apparent however that there 
were significant outliers- with some of the ratios showing an average value lower than the bottom one 
percentile value.  To adjust for these outliers, I set five percent of the observations in each tail of the 
distribution to the 95th and 5th percentile values, winsorizing the distribution for each calculated ratio.  
Similarly, in adjusting for extreme values, smaller firms were removed from later analysis and averages 
(firms with total assets less than $5 million).   
Finally, financials and real estate related firms were removed from the dataset. This affected eight 
observations (those with SIC codes 6099, 6153, 6200, 6211, 6510, 6552).  Those with SIC codes 
beginning in 99 were also removed, given that they deal with international affairs, foreign governments 
or non-operating establishments, affecting another 212 observations.   
Including both firms in violation and firms not in violation, and excluding firms with assets smaller than 
$5 million and firms with given SIC codes mentioned before, there were 8614 observations, 4921 for the 
2001 recession and 3693 for 2008 recession.      
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Preliminary Analysis of Complete Violation Dataset 
A preliminary count of covenant violations reported in each of the years between 1996 and 2008 
inclusive showed a slight uptick in 2008 in violations.  In absolute terms however, the number seen in 
2008 is much lower than the total number of violations observed in 2001 (360 versus 728).  Knowing 
that the 2008 recession is much more severe than its 2001 counterpart, I would normally expect the 
violations in 2008 to be much higher.  However, if we recall the discussion mentioned earlier regarding 
defaults rates preceding the 2001 and 2008 recession with respect to the figures taken from the IMF 
Report, a lower observed number of reported violations could be due to the implications of covenant-
lite lending popularity leading into the 2008 recession.    
Figure 5. Number of Covenant Violations Reported by Year As a quick reminder, IMF reported a 
dramatic rise in default rates typically 
preceding the official start date of a 
recession, but shows defaults only 
beginning to pick up leading into the 
2008 recession.  The lower number of 
violations in 2008 versus 2001 observed 
in Professor Nini’s violation data thus 
corroborates the findings of the IMF 
report.   
As mentioned in earlier sections of this 
paper, our hypothesis is that the 
increase in defaults often accompanying 
softening of the economy could 
potentially have been delayed in the 
2008 recession as the result of loosening 
in covenants seen many debt 
agreements formed in the years prior.  
Source: Calculated from Violation data from Professor Gregory Nini  In other words, despite possibly having 
same or worse deterioration in financials, firms may have yet to trigger covenant constraints because 
covenant packages were so lax.     
To determine if this is actually is the case, I then moved on to financial ratio analysis to get a sense of 
the financial health of firms violating covenants in 2001 versus that of firms in violation in 2008.   
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Ratio Comparison between 2001 and 2008 Firms in Violation: General 
The first step was to refine the data as described earlier.  I first removed the entries falling under 
undesired SIC codes.  Before winsorizing the data and before removing firms with total assets under $5 
million, average values for calculated ratios are as shown in Chart 1.   Please note that negative D/E 
ratios resulting from negative equity values were excluded from the averages presented in Chart 1.   
Chart 1. Average Values of Financial Ratios before Adjustments for Outliers and Small Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking solely at firms in violation in 2001 versus 2008, the data without elimination of outliers actually 
seems to indicate that 2001 firms in violation were in worse shape financially than their 2008 
counterparts.  In general, healthier firms should have:  
 Higher ROA 
 Higher liquidity ratios (Current, Quick, Working Capital) 
 Lower leverage ratios (D/A, LTA, D/E) 
 Higher debt service coverage ratios (ETL) 
 
From Chart 1, 2008 firms on average have less negative (higher) ROA, higher current, quick and working 
capital ratios, lower D/A, LTA, and D/E, and then less negative ETL (which as a reminder is EBITDA over 
total liabilities at the beginning of the year).  So essentially, all the financial ratios are indicating that if 
anything, 2008 firms that violated covenants were actually in better shape economically than 2001 firms.     
 2001 2008 
Average  In Violation Not in Violation In Violation Not in Violation 
ROA -0.312  -4.686  -0.149  -2.193  
Current 1.645  3.268  1.720  3.301  
Quick 0.987  2.582  1.025  2.619  
Working Capital -0.025  -1.773  0.016  -9.112  
D/A 0.454  1.127  0.402  0.825  
LTA 0.819  3.091  0.762  10.189  
D/E 4.411  1.290  3.206  3.216  
ETL -0.304  -1.644  -0.263  -1.272  
Source: Violation data attained from Professor Gregory Nini, financials from Compustat 
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However, a closer examination of the actual distribution of values revealed a number of outliers that 
may be skewing the results.   For instance, average ROA for 2008 firms in violation is indeed less 
negative than the average ROA for 2001 firms in violation.  However, the lowest ROA found amongst the 
2001 observations is -92.715 versus -4.485 amongst 2008 observations.  ETL is similarly less negative for 
2008 firms than for 2001 firms, but once again, the smallest value for ETL for 2001 firms in violation was 
-66.967 versus -14.464 for 2008 firms in violation.  If we look at overall values for 2001 versus 2008 
(inclusion of all firms in violation or not), the averages for ROA and the working capital ratios are actually 
below the bottom first percentile of the distribution.  Though these facts don’t necessarily mean that 
conclusions resulting from the above unrefined data are false, it does necessitate or at least lend desire 
for further analysis with the removal of such outliers.   
Chart 2. 90% Winsorized Means of Financial Ratios, Excluding Firms with Assets < $5mm 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 90% Winsorization was applied to each of the four categories of observations (2001 in violation, 2001 
not in violation, 2008 in violation, and 2008 not in violation), setting all data below the 5th percentile to 
the 5th percentile and similarly setting all data above the 95th percentile to the 95th percentile.  Firms 
with assets below five million USD were also excluded from averages- resulting in the values for the 
financial ratios as displayed in Chart 2.   
With these adjustments, the average values of these financial ratios have changed quite a bit and 
differences between 2001 and 2008 means have diminished.   There still isn’t evidence supporting our 
hypothesis however.  In fact, the results are quite mixed; though ROA and ETL are more negative for 
2008 firms versus 2001 in violation, 2008 firms still have higher liquidity ratios and lower leverage ratios.   
 2001 2008 
Average  In Violation Not in Violation In Violation Not in Violation 
ROA -0.118  -0.074  -0.120  -0.038  
Current 1.478  2.461  1.539  2.211  
Quick 0.856  1.757  0.874  1.517  
Working Capital 0.034  0.192  0.071  0.183  
D/A 0.412  0.270  0.365 0.284 
LTA 0.745  0.550  0.697  0.591  
D/E 1.795  0.776  1.607  0.879  
ETL -0.132  -0.235  -0.204  -0.005 
Source: Violation data attained from Professor Gregory Nini, financials from Compustat 
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Ratio Comparison between 2001 and 2008 Firms in Violation: Within Industry 
Before concluding that there is lack of evidence corroborating any significant negative impacts of a 
looser covenant structure, it would be worthwhile to subdivide the analysis by industry and compare 
2001 and 2008 firms in violation within industries.  The data is split using the first two digits of the SIC 
code for each firm (with SIC codes less than 1000 having just one digit).  Industries with less than 100 
observations (counting both firms in violation and not in violation) after both the 90% winsorization and 
adjusting for small firms were excluded, leaving us with 19 subsets of data to conduct ratio comparisons 
for.   
For simplicity, Chart 3 (please see pages 12-16) displays the average values for just four of the original 
eight financial ratios.  The ratios highlighted in grey under each subset of data indicates that the 
relationship between the ratio for 2001 firms in violation versus the ratio for 2008 firms in violation is 
one which supports the hypothesis.  Once again, for the majority of the industries, the data continues to 
give mixed indications of financial health, and there isn’t clear evidence either supporting or overturning 
the stated hypothesis.  It may be worth pointing out that of the 19 industry groups only one has all four 
financial ratios indicating greater deterioration in financial health of 2008 firms in violation versus 2001 
firms in violation.  However, there were four industry groups for which all four financial ratios indicate 
the opposite- greater deterioration in financial health for 2001 firms versus 2008 firms.   
In doing this analysis, I have also expressed the current ratio and D/A ratio for firms in violation in each 
industry as a percentage of the ratio for firms not in violation within the same industry- calculating a 
“relative” ratio.  This idea of a “relative” ratio is derived from the concept and use of industry-relative 
ratios found in bankruptcy prediction models where the use of these ratios adjust for differences across 
industries as to what is a “good” or healthy level for a particular financial ratio14.   
For the purposes of this analysis however, the goal in using the relative ratio is to show the relation 
between the ratios of firms in violation versus those not in violation within that year in hopes of 
removing the effects of shifts in general levels of these ratios between 2001 and 2008.    
 These relative ratios are presented in Chart 4 (on page 17).  With respect to the relative current ratio, a 
higher value indicates better financial health (the higher the value, the greater liquidity relative to 
industry current ratio).  The relative D/A ratio is just the opposite: a lower value indicates better 
financial health in general (the lower the number, the lower the leverage relative to the industry).  The 
calculated ratios and relationships between 2001 and 2008 continues to be relatively inconclusive in 
either supporting or rejecting our hypothesis, once again delivering mixed signals on financial health of 
these firms.  If any conclusion were to be drawn however, it would be on the end of rejecting the 
hypothesis, given that of the 19 SIC code subsets, only five showed 2001 D/A relative ratio to be lower 
than the 2008 D/A relative ratio.  Given that this is just one measure of financial health however, this 
isn’t substantial enough evidence to reject the possibility that there were negative implications of 
covenant-lite lending.   
                                                             
14 Platt and Platt (1991).   
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Revisiting Overall Data on Firms not in Violation for 2001 and 2008 
Chart 2. 90% Winsorized Means of Financial Ratios, Excluding Firms with Assets < $5mm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given that there is a lack of clear evidence either for or against the stated hypothesis thus far, I’d like to 
shift focus away from the firms in violation to firms not in violation.  The stated hypothesis as a reminder 
is that firms in violation would be in worse financial health than those in 2001 since there was increased 
covenant-lite lending leading into 2008.  However, the spotlight could be turned instead on firms not in 
violation.  Because it’s believed that it will take firms longer to trip covenants in the recent recession 
because of the loosening in recent years, the firms left reporting that they are not in violation should 
also be in worse shape financially on average versus those not in violation in 2001.  It’s also worth 
wondering if the firms that tripped the covenants early the recent recession (the ones in the violation 
data here for the year 2008) are firms that were unable to negotiate looser loan packages in general, 
thus explaining their similar financial state to firms in violation back in 2001.    
Looking just at the overall average financial ratios for firms not in violation,  though ROA and ETL are 
lower for 2001 firms versus 2008, all the other ratios (all three liquidity ratios and three leverage ratios) 
would indicate firms in 2001 to be in better shape than those in 2008.   However, further industry-level 
analysis analogous to that done for firms in violation proves to be similarly inconclusive.  Also, granted 
that the recent recession is thought by many to be more severe than the 2001 recession, it is quite 
possible even if there was a marked difference in firm health amongst non-violation firms in 2008, it 
could simply be due to the harsher economic environment.    
 2001 2008 
Average  In Violation Not in Violation In Violation Not in Violation 
ROA -0.118  -0.074  -0.120  -0.038  
Current 1.478  2.461  1.539  2.211  
Quick 0.856  1.757  0.874  1.517  
Working Capital 0.034  0.192  0.071  0.183  
D/A 0.412  0.270  0.365 0.284 
LTA 0.745  0.550  0.697  0.591  
D/E 1.795  0.776  1.607  0.879  
ETL -0.132  -0.235  -0.204  -0.005 
Source: Violation data attained from Professor Gregory Nini, financials from Compustat 
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CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
In comparing 2001 firms in violation with 2008 firms in violation (and similarly with firms not in violation 
in 2001 versus 2008), profitability, leverage and liquidity or cash flow generation ratios were examined.  
Ratios were chosen based on existing research detailing the use of financial statement information or 
calculated ratios in predicting bankruptcy.  In general it is believed that financial ratios do have 
predictive power in the five years preceding bankruptcy and though similar models were not created (to 
predict bankruptcy for the firms in violation), I pulled ratios for which predictive power seemed reliable 
and had a direct trend with respect to financial health.  Further subdivision of the data into industry 
groups was done for a more detailed ratio comparison.  To try to account for possibility that the 
absolute levels of these ratios may have changed between 2001 and 2008, I looked at the ratios for 
firms in violation as a percentage of the ratios for firms not in violation in that year within the industry 
level analyses.    
Overall there did not seem to be conclusive evidence either in support of or against the stated 
hypothesis regarding negative implications of covenant-lite lending leading into the 2008 recession.  In 
general, there was no consensus amongst the different ratios as to whether the average firm in violation 
in 2008 saw greater deterioration in financial health.   
Moving forward, there are a number of other possible areas for further investigation.  It would be 
interesting to look at the few industries that did have indication that one group of firms was in better 
shape economically than the other.  Perhaps these are the industries that received the bulk of covenant-
lite loans.  Or, the opposite: they saw very little loosening in their covenants.  Also, there was definitely a 
very similar reduction in covenant usage or strictness leading into the 2001 recession as well, and 
though the loosening is arguably less noticeably than that seen in the period 2005-2007, it is possible 
that this research was merely comparing firms in violation of loosened covenant structure- in which case, 
it makes sense that the firms would be in similar statuses in terms of financial health.  It may therefore 
also be worth comparing firms in violation in 2008 to firms in violation in years preceding the loosening 
in 2005 but after 2001.     
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Chart 3. Adjusted Mean Financial Ratios by Industry 
   2001 2008 
sic2 #Observ. Average  In Violation Not in Violation In Violation Not in Violation 
13 308 ROA -0.144  0.039  -0.229  0.002  
  Current 0.771  1.279  0.883  1.696  
  D/A 0.533  0.361  0.490  0.331  
  ETL -0.034  0.333  -0.410  0.242  
20 176 ROA -0.087  0.048  -0.256  0.027  
  Current 1.190  2.056  0.923  2.072  
  D/A 0.497  0.310  0.397  0.312  
  ETL -0.036  0.283  -0.688  0.243  
28 693 ROA -0.095  -0.203  -0.124  -0.195  
  Current 1.627  4.203  1.678  2.989  
  D/A 0.407  0.245  0.315  0.284  
  ETL -0.139  -0.876  -0.211  -0.508  
33 117 ROA -0.052  -0.003  0.070  0.067  
  Current 2.127  2.182  0.792  2.767  
  D/A 0.472  0.332  0.712  0.255  
  ETL -0.100  0.136  0.094  0.337  
34 120 ROA -0.034  0.036  -0.027  0.061  
  Current 1.475  2.344  1.536  2.804  
  D/A 0.473  0.309  0.381  0.258  
  ETL 0.034  0.138  0.022  0.301  
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Chart 3. Adjusted Mean Financial Ratios by Industry (continued) 
   2001 2008 
sic2 #Observ. Average  In Violation Not in Violation In Violation Not in Violation 
35 424 ROA -0.114  -0.073  -0.091  -0.018  
  Current 1.653  2.881  2.297  2.380  
  D/A 0.351  0.226  0.261  0.208  
  ETL -0.127  -0.191  -0.204  0.102  
36 596 ROA -0.143  -0.124  -0.148  -0.075  
  Current 2.022  3.840  2.341  2.912  
  D/A 0.352  0.216  0.200  0.236  
  ETL -0.211  -0.506  -0.309  -0.152  
37 165 ROA -0.116  0.009  -0.063  0.005  
  Current 1.305  1.691  1.995  2.145  
  D/A 0.444  0.294  0.336  0.282  
  ETL -0.129  0.046  -0.009  0.124  
38 481 ROA -0.098  -0.128  -0.148  -0.088  
  Current 2.243  3.389  2.219  3.216  
  D/A 0.269  0.170  0.228  0.198  
  ETL -0.194  -0.473  -0.292  -0.221  
48 314 ROA -0.211  -0.162  -0.095  -0.066  
  Current 0.907  1.638  0.935  1.758  
  D/A 0.609  0.436  0.541  0.488  
  ETL -0.185  -0.360  -0.117  -0.015  
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Chart 3. Adjusted Mean Financial Ratios by Industry (continued) 
   2001 2008 
sic2 #Observ. Average  In Violation Not in Violation In Violation Not in Violation 
49 299 ROA 0.041  0.053  -0.036  0.052  
  Current 1.032  1.033  1.056  1.244  
  D/A 0.424  0.409  0.352  0.353  
  ETL 0.143  0.148  -0.086  0.152  
50 188 ROA -0.096  0.028  -0.061  0.042  
  Current 1.668  2.404  1.940  2.354  
  D/A 0.391  0.282  0.258  0.228  
  ETL -0.068  0.132  -0.097  0.206  
51 116 ROA -0.034  0.014  -0.066  0.021  
  Current 1.156  1.703  1.064  2.064  
  D/A 0.388  0.279  0.541  0.264  
  ETL 0.011  0.178  -0.033  0.167  
58 132 ROA -0.052  0.031  -0.029  0.016  
  Current 0.770  0.843  0.691  0.854  
  D/A 0.475  0.313  0.323  0.370  
  ETL 0.030  0.331  0.041  0.158  
59 167 ROA -0.155  -0.022  -0.108  0.023  
  Current 1.399  2.286  1.593  1.793  
  D/A 0.343  0.252  0.412  0.303  
  ETL -0.136  -0.074  -0.127  0.167  
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Chart 3. Adjusted Mean Financial Ratios by Industry (continued) 
   2001 2008 
sic2 #Observ. Average  In Violation Not in Violation In Violation Not in Violation 
73 921 ROA -0.234  -0.248  -0.143  -0.043  
  Current 1.299  2.317  1.058  1.882  
  D/A 0.292  0.185  0.328  0.230  
  ETL -0.370  -0.892  -0.292  -0.011  
79 109 ROA -0.079  -0.026  -0.052  -0.054  
  Current 0.833  1.446  0.920  1.046  
  D/A 0.753  0.436  0.600  0.450  
  ETL -0.087  0.035  -0.045  -0.239  
80 167 ROA -0.214  0.022  -0.004  0.033  
  Current 1.176  2.132  1.555  2.043  
  D/A 0.440  0.339  0.417  0.320  
  ETL -0.293  0.101  0.062  0.232  
87 155 ROA -0.174  -0.089  -0.126  -0.072  
  Current 1.407  2.816  1.166  1.940  
  D/A 0.382  0.214  0.404  0.202  
  ETL -0.252  -0.343  -0.162  -0.130  
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Chart 4. Adjusted Mean Relative Financial Ratios by Industry 
sic2 #Observ. Average  2001 2008 sic2 #Observ. Average  2001 2008 
13 308 Current 0.603  0.521  35 424 Current 0.574  0.965  
  D/A 1.476  1.480    D/A 1.553  1.255  
20 176 Current 0.579  0.445  36 596 Current 0.527  0.804  
  D/A 1.603  1.272    D/A 1.630  0.847  
28 693 Current 0.387  0.561  37 165 Current 0.772  0.930  
  D/A 1.661  1.109    D/A 1.510  1.191  
33 117 Current 0.975  0.286  38 481 Current 0.662  0.690  
  D/A 1.422  2.792    D/A 1.582  1.152  
34 120 Current 0.629  0.548  48 314 Current 0.554  0.532  
  D/A 1.531  1.477    D/A 1.397  1.109  
sic2 #Observ. Average  2001 2008 sic2 #Observ. Average  2001 2008 
49 299 Current 0.999  0.849  73 921 Current 0.561  0.562  
  D/A 1.037  0.997    D/A 1.578  1.426  
50 188 Current 0.694  0.824  79 109 Current 0.576  0.880  
  D/A 1.387  1.132    D/A 1.727  1.333  
51 116 Current 0.679  0.516  80 167 Current 0.552  0.761  
  D/A 1.391  2.049    D/A 1.298  1.303  
58 132 Current 0.913  0.809  87 155 Current 0.500  0.601  
  D/A 1.518  0.873    D/A 1.785  2.000  
59 167 Current 0.612  0.888       
  D/A 1.361  1.360       
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